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This article relies on advertising and persuasive communications theories to uncover persistent variations in
investor response to television stock recommendations targeting naive investors. The authors use an event study
methodology to determine the size of the next-day abnormal market reaction to recommendations on Mad Money
with Jim Cramer. Although viewers are actively looking for recommendations, the results show that any individual
recommendation is still subject to many of the same communication challenges as traditional advertisements. A
regression analysis finds that traditional advertising variables, such as message length, recency–primacy effects,
information clutter, and source credibility, influence the size of the market reaction to a “buy” recommendation. The
authors discuss implications for marketers, managers of public companies, and those interested in public policy
aspects related to televised stock recommendations.
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I just want to make you money, because my job is not just
to entertain you, but to educate you, so call me at 1-800-
743-CNBC.
—Jim Cramer
The opening line of the Mad Money with Jim Cramertelevision show sounds surprisingly like an advertise-ment. Although Jim Cramer’s stock recommenda-
tions are technically not advertisements, they are persuasive
messages delivered through mass media. Research in
finance and economics has found evidence of a general
positive reaction to “buy” recommendations aired on Mad
Money taking place on the day following the broadcast of
the show (e.g., Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams 2006,
2007; Lim and Rosario 2008; Neumann and Kenny 2007).
We expand these findings by using traditional advertising
and persuasive communications factors to examine which
1We focus on buy recommendations because sell recommenda-
tions do not lend themselves to this type of analysis, partly
because advertising convinces people to buy rather than sell a
product and, more important, not all the viewers can act on the sell
recommendations because they do not own the mentioned securi-
ties in their portfolios and/or do not use sophisticated tools, such
as options or short-selling, that would allow them to trade based
on the recommendation regardless of whether they own the stocks.
of these buy recommendations are likely to generate the
greatest reaction.1
Although many of the shows’ viewers are actively seek-
ing recommendations, we find that traditional advertising
and persuasive communications variables, such as message
length, recency–primacy effects, information clutter, and
source credibility, influence the size of the market reaction
following a buy recommendation. In addition to uncovering
potential arbitrage opportunities for investors, this research
has implications for emergent targeted advertising
approaches, such as various forms of advertising based on
consumer Internet searches and browsing history or cus-
tomized shopping portal recommendation lists, because it
suggests that the communication challenges associated with
traditional advertisements persist even when highly targeted
messages are communicated to receptive and attentive audi-
ences. In addition, these results should provide insights for
managers who are interested in how expert third-party rec-
ommendations targeted at naive investors affect stock price,
for executives who use appearances on stock recommenda-
tion shows in their public relations strategy, and for people
interested in the public policy implications of providing
stock recommendations to a large group of naive investors.
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Background and Motivation for the
Study
Every day, investors are bombarded with investment recom-
mendations in newspaper and magazine articles, on televi-
sion shows, and in spam e-mails (Frieder and Zittrain
2007). Because no new information is typically embedded
in these recommendations, the efficient market hypothesis
would suggest that stock prices should not react to them.
Nevertheless, the market reacts to such recommendations in
general (e.g., Barber, Lehavy, and McNichols 2001; Elton,
Gruber, and Grossman 1986; Womack 1996) and to Jim
Cramer’s recommendations on Mad Money in particular
(e.g., Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams 2006, 2007; Lim
and Rosario 2008; Neumann and Kenny 2007).
It is believed that individual investors are highly suscep-
tible to mass-media investment recommendations because
of the high search costs associated with a wide array of
available options. For example, Jain and Wu (2000) show
increased resource flows to the mutual funds advertised in
business periodicals. Barber and Odean (2008) find that
individual investors are net buyers of stocks that have
recently been mentioned in the news, are experiencing
abnormal volumes, and have extreme one-day returns.
Frieder and Zittrain (2007) uncover short-term market fluc-
tuations in reaction to spam e-mails, suggesting that stock
prices are affected by even the least credible forms of
information.
We analyze the Mad Money show as opposed to more
sophisticated financial programming because it is clearly
targeted at naive investors. The Stalwart (2005), an Internet
blog targeted at financial industry professionals, states that
“Jim Cramer’s CNBC show Mad Money is an addictive
guilty pleasure… His frenzied 5-second analysis on hun-
dreds of stocks never ceases to amuse. But we won’t turn to
him for investment advice … as most of what he says sim-
ply describes the previous day’s market action.” This senti-
ment agrees with our interviews of finance professionals,
including financial planners and mutual fund managers. Our
interviewees stated that Mad Money’s appeal is limited to
those outside the financial industry. Several mutual fund
managers admitted that they occasionally watch the show
and even receive e-mails with Mad Money recaps, but none
of them traded on the basis of the show’s suggestions.
Jim Cramer specifically targets naive investors. He
rarely uses complicated financial jargon or provides in-
depth analysis. He favors clear-cut buy/sell recommenda-
tions and does not resort to ambiguous statements that are
common to this type of programming. He also incorporates
a strong entertainment component in his show. Cramer
resorts to a wide array of ostentatious tricks, including
dressing up in costumes, shouting, using and sometimes
breaking props, throwing objects on the set, and using vari-
ous sound effects, all of which make his program similar to
advertising environments traditionally studied by marketing
scholars. Regardless of one’s personal stand regarding his
antics, it is difficult to dispute that Cramer succeeds in grab-
bing his audience’s attention. The Hollywood Reporter
(Gough 2006) attests that, on average, more than a quarter
million viewers watch Mad Money on CNBC.
Another advantage of analyzing Mad Money is that Jim
Cramer tries to minimize recommendation leaks during the
taping of the show, which makes its impact more tractable.
Other shows, such as Fast Money, provide more sophisti-
cated commentaries aimed at more informed investors and
often supply general insights into savvy financial products
and tools (i.e., derivatives, commodities, and technical
analysis) that are not suitable for an average individual
investor. Moreover, the experts featured in these programs
frequently appear on other network shows that provide
similar recommendations during the trading day, which has
a contaminating effect.
Conceptual Framework
As with any persuasive attempt, message intensity, presen-
tation order, and source credibility can affect consumer
decisions. In addition, various psychological and cognitive
processes and biases may influence consumer judgment.
Therefore, we use an event study methodology to quantify
an individual stock’s reaction to Mad Money recommenda-
tions and then use regression analysis to uncover the factors
that affect the size of the resulting abnormalities. In particu-
lar, we explain the relative size of the next-day market reac-
tion by using variables associated with traditional advertis-
ing and persuasive communication frameworks. In spirit,
our investigation is similar to those in the emerging field of
behavioral finance (Barberis and Thaler 2003) and market-
ing that demonstrate how various heuristics and biases lead
to irrational stock market behaviors (Johnson, Tellis, and
MacInnis 2005). We follow the framework outlined in
Figure 1.
Previous research on the impact of Mad Money recom-
mendations has documented the overall inefficiencies of
financial markets. Neumann and Kenny (2007) analyze 162
buy recommendations and document an average next-day
abnormal return of 1.06%, which is followed by a steady
price decline. Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2007)
analyze 391 initial buy recommendations and find that
stock prices increased by an average of 2.86% on the day
after the show aired but then fell back to their previous lev-
els within several trading days. Both studies find a signifi-
cant run-up in security prices before the event. Despite the
host’s claims regarding the show’s efforts to prevent infor-
mation leaks, Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2007)
mention information leakage as a possible explanation for
this run-up. They also document that arbitrage plays by
informed investors following such recommendations as
short-sale volumes for recommended stocks increase on the
day following recommendations and that the magnitude of
the volume spike is proportional to the size of the arbitrage
opportunity available.
These prior studies have also outlined factors related to
underlying securities that could influence the size of the
abnormal market reaction. Similarly, we include several
control variables (which we discuss subsequently) that are
characteristics of the underlying securities (rather than the
recommendations) that could be related to the behavior of
naive and informed investors. Such factors are captured by
the far outer level of Figure 1. For example, we include the
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FIGURE 1
Conceptual Framework (Shaded Areas Represent This Study’s Contribution)
market capitalization of the underlying security because, in
general, larger cap stocks are more liquid and have fewer
limits to arbitrage (i.e., factors diminishing the ability of
informed traders to trade away market inefficiencies). It is
more difficult for informed market players to sell small cap
stocks short because this requires them to borrow shares
that may not be available.
In addition to accounting for the security-related
aspects, limits to arbitrage, and history of wealth redistribu-
tion, the inner box of Figure 1, which is linked to naive
investor behavior, examines the impact of show-related
characteristics by introducing traditional advertising and
persuasive communications variables to explain which rec-
ommendations receive the strongest reaction from naive
investors. These variables are linked to information unique-
ness, information-processing environment, reach, and
aspects of source credibility; we discuss these in greater
detail in the next section.
Research Questions and
Hypotheses
Information Uniqueness
We consider the impact of information uniqueness by
examining new versus repeat recommendations. Advertis-
ing effectiveness has been found to be susceptible to
“threshold” effects (Blair 1987; Pechmann and Stewart
1988) and “wearout” effects (Haley 1978; Simon 1982;
2Another difference is that Cramer is not a paid endorser. In
addition, traditionally, a message must have an identifiable spon-
sor to be considered an advertisement (e.g., American Marketing
Association 1960). However, this demarcation is growing less
relevant today as companies attempt to fly under the radar of skep-
tical consumers by devising advertisements that are less identifi-
able and, at times, completely covert (e.g., Dahlén and Edenius
2007).
Winter 1973), leading to an inverted U-shaped relationship
between the number of exposures and advertising effective-
ness (for a summary of this research stream, see Anand and
Sternthal 1990). Jim Cramer’s recommendations to buy cer-
tain stocks are similar to traditional television advertise-
ments in that both are impersonal broadcast messages per-
suading investors/consumers to make a particular purchase.
At the same time, there are some critical differences. For
example, stock recommendations operate in a high-
involvement environment. Viewers are actually looking for
recommendations rather than enduring an advertisement to
watch a show.2 If viewers are actively looking for unique
stock recommendations, we would not expect any threshold
effect, just a rapid wearout effect. For example, Busse and
Green (2002) show that investors incorporate television
stock recommendations from CNBC’s Opening Call and
Midday Call almost instantly. In addition, investors could
have acted on previous recommendations, and already hav-
Impact of Mad Money Stock Recommendations / 247
3To control for portfolio effects associated with previous recom-
mendations for the repeat stocks, we introduce the coverage inten-
sity variable that captures the number of times the stock has been
recommended by Cramer divided by the number of days since his
first recommendation.
ing a stock in their portfolio could deter them from acting
on the recommendation again.3
H1: Market reaction to an initial stock recommendation is
stronger than it is to subsequent recommendations.
Information Processing
We hypothesize that several factors related to the
information-processing environment of the Mad Money
show are related to abnormal returns. These include the
presence of primacy and recency effects, clutter and compe-
tition from concurrent recommendations, and message
length. We discuss each in turn.
Primacy–recency effects. Pieters and Bijmolt (1997)
find that there are modest recall advantages associated with
first (last) commercials in a block of television commer-
cials, indicating the presence of primacy (recency) effects.
Webb and Ray (1979) find that 70% of people in their sam-
ple exhibited recall patterns that were consistent with a pri-
macy effect. We hypothesize that similar effects increase
the size of abnormal returns following individual recom-
mendations because it is more likely that individual
investors will act on recommendations that are more readily
retrievable from memory.
H2: The primacy effect of stock pick order is associated with a
stronger market response.
H3: The recency effect of stock pick order is associated with a
stronger market response.
Clutter and competition. Stocks in the same industry/
market segment may compete for an individual investor’s
attention because of industry knowledge or expectations
regarding sector performance. The presence of competing
stock picks in general (regardless of sector membership) is
likely to reduce the chances of an individual stock being
purchased by the viewers. Here, we draw the connection
with the work of Burke and Srull (1988), who show that the
presence of competitive advertising affects consumer
memory.
Advertising clutter can create consumer overload,
decrease viewer attention span, and interfere with cognitive
responses (Keller 1987, 1991; Webb 1979; Zhao 1997).
Marketing literature finds that, in general, recall for
commercials/brands decreases as clutter increases (Webb
1979; Webb and Ray 1979). Webb and Ray (1979) find that
in unaided recall situations, people can recall only a certain
number of advertised brands, regardless of how many com-
mercials they view. Kent and Allen (1993) show that
competitive clutter substantially reduces brand name recall
scores. Although there is convincing evidence that clutter
interferes with advertising effectiveness, its effects may not
transfer to television stock recommendations. Webb (1979)
finds that the detriment from clutter is present only in low-
involvement situations (for a detailed summary of clutter-
related advertising studies, see Brown and Rothschild
1993). Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2007) examine
the effect of the number of non–Lightning Round (we dis-
cuss these Mad Money segment designations in greater
detail in the “Data” section) recommendations on the next-
day price abnormality and find a negative but nonsignificant
relationship.
H4: An increase in the number of total recommendations in
the same show decreases the response to a
recommendation.
H5: An increase in the number of similar (i.e., same industry)
recommendations in the same show decreases the
response to a recommendation.
Message length. As late as 1965, most U.S. television
commercials were 60 seconds in length. By the 1980s,
94.6% were 30-second commercials. Now, the mix is
approximately 38% 15-second commercials and 54% 30-
second commercials (Television Bureau of Advertising
2009). This finding indicates that many advertising profes-
sionals did not believe that the extra length was worth the
cost, and it is consistent with research conducted at the time
30-second commercials were introduced (e.g., Wheatley
1968), which found only directionally, but not significantly,
stronger results in terms of brand recall, attitude change, or
product desire for 60-second versus 30-second commer-
cials. In contrast, Anand and Sternthal (1990) find support
for the general notion that the time available for message
processing influences the effectiveness of the message, and
Pieters and Bijmolt (1997) find that both duration of the
commercial and competition from other commercials in the
same block influence recall.
Previous research on the response to Mad Money rec-
ommendations has found some evidence of a relationship
between message length and size of response. Engelberg,
Sasseville, and Williams (2007) find a 2% lower (p < .01)
response to recommendations in the highly condensed
Lightning Round segment than in the non–Lightning Round
segments. Lim and Rosario (2008) compare the responses
to the caller-initiated versus host-initiated picks and find
that the abnormal returns are more pronounced for more
elaborate host-initiated recommendations. However, in both
studies, message length is confounded with whether the rec-
ommendation was viewer- or host-initiated because the
Lightning Round and Sudden Death segments contain pri-
marily less elaborate and viewer-initiated picks. Still, in the
context of Mad Money, there are three reasons to expect that
the more elaborate recommendations should be associated
with stronger investor reaction. First, the message is longer,
giving more time for information processing. Second, there
are typically fewer stocks in this program segment and,
therefore, less clutter. Third, these are stocks that Cramer
has thought about in more detail. We provide a more
nuanced examination of this issue by identifying more
detailed and lengthy recommendations that are classified as
Special Mention, regardless of the segment they appear in,
and by modeling the response for each segment of the
program.
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H6: Market response to more (less) elaborate recommenda-
tions is stronger (weaker).
Reach
Even with a lot of on- and offline word-of-mouth activity
surrounding Cramer’s recommendations, it is reasonable to
assume that the more people who watch the show, the
greater is the impact of his message, and the larger is the
size of the naive investor pool exposed to his recommenda-
tions. Therefore, we hypothesize that greater reach is asso-
ciated with greater stock price reaction. Previous literature
(Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams 2007) has found only
directional, but not statistically significant, support for this
hypothesis.
H7: The size of the television audience is positively associated
with market response.
Source Credibility and Leaning
Finally, we examine the aspects related to source credibility
(Hovland, Janis, and Kelley 1953) and learning. In particu-
lar, we examine the classic dimensions of perceived source
credibility: expertise and trustworthiness. Expertise in this
setting could be defined as the host’s track record on a
particular security, and overall trustworthiness could be
inferred from the consistency of the host’s position on a
particular stock as well as the overall historical perfor-
mance. We also take on a learning perspective and argue
that investors not only pay attention to various credibility
considerations but also learn in response to persistent
wealth redistribution from naive to informed investors.
Negative conditioning. If price movements are exploited
by institutional players and if individual investors learn that
price shifts following Cramer’s recommendations are tem-
porary and thus lose their trust in the host, the negative con-
ditioning will make these investors less likely to follow
future recommendations. As first suggested by Engelberg,
Sasseville, and Williams (2006, 2007), we hypothesize that
the large price jumps that follow the earlier broadcasts sub-
side over time because of the influence of informed arbi-
trage players and gradual naive investor learning evoked by
such strategies.
Moreover, when investors are led to believe that stock
prices will increase, but they actually decrease after pur-
chase, the situation is akin to the impact of deceptive or
false advertising, which has been studied by marketing
scholars. In the marketing literature (i.e., Olson and Dover
1978, p. 30), deception is “considered to occur when con-
sumers acquire demonstrably false beliefs as a function of
exposure to an advertisement.” In a longitudinal experi-
ment, Olson and Dover (1978) demonstrate that false claims
and subsequent product trial result in significant reduction
in pretrial purchase intentions.
H8: The magnitude of stock price fluctuations induced by the
show declines over time.
Historical accuracy. Although Cramer is not explicitly
trying to sell anything, his brand and credibility are depen-
dent on the correctness of his picks because they are tied to
his perceived expertise. If investors are engaged in learning
(Erdem and Keane 1996), we expect them to update their
assessment of Cramer’s expertise on particular stocks. This
would make them more likely to react positively to a par-
ticular stock recommendation when his previous recom-
mendations have been successful.
H9: Accuracy of the host’s previous pick for a given stock
influences the strength of market response.
Recommendation reversals. We also examine the impact
of recommendation reversal and its interaction with the
accuracy of previous predictions, which has not been con-
sidered in previous studies. Recommendation reversals are
often confusing for naive investors, and they also affect the
trustworthiness of the host. In marketing literature, attribu-
tion theory is often used to explain consumer reaction to
various unexpected occurrences; this theory suggests that
the perceived reason for an event influences consumer moti-
vation and subsequent behavior (Bettman 1979). This
framework has helped shed light on various marketing
issues; for example, several studies successfully use this
approach to predict consumer reactions to product failure
(e.g., Folkes 1984). McGill (1991) points out that con-
sumers’ attribution for product failure varies with causal
background. If a stock-picking service is viewed as a prod-
uct, an inaccurate pick would be similar to a product failure.
Therefore, the background information must be consid-
ered—for example, whether a previous recommendation on
the stock was correct and whether a reversal is an admit-
tance of a mistake or just an acknowledgment of a changing
environment. When future price movements contradict one
of the host’s previous recommendations, a subsequent rec-
ommendation reversal could lead either to strong investor
reaction or to the loss of credibility on the part of the host.
Recommendation reversals share similarities with a
political candidate’s policy changes. Political science litera-
ture finds that, among other things, policy changes increase
voter uncertainty (Alvarez and Nagler 2002). Tavits (2007)
differentiates between different political domains and
argues that policy reversals could be rewarded (punished)
by voters when the underlying issue is pragmatic (ideologi-
cal). Policy reversals on pragmatic issues are perceived as
signs of flexibility and adaptation to changing economic
conditions, whereas reversals that strike a voter’s ideologi-
cal cord are perceived as signs of inconsistency, thus under-
mining candidates’ credibility and voter rapport. If viewers
take a pragmatic perspective, they could regard reversals as
necessary adaptations to changing conditions. These rever-
sals will be taken seriously by investors if they infer that
new information was sufficiently persuasive to cause
Cramer to reverse his previous recommendation. Alterna-
tively, if viewers do not take a pragmatic stance, recommen-
dation reversals could undermine the host’s credibility and
make investors doubt his expertise when it comes to a par-
ticular security (which could later turn into distrust of the
show in general).
H10: When the host reverses his recommendation on a stock,
the resulting stock price change is greater than the one
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4In this study, we use market capitalization as a measure of
stock popularity.
that would have taken place on a repeated
recommendation.
H11: Accuracy of previous prediction moderates market
response to recommendation reversals.
Control Variables
The general level of awareness of a stock may influence the
level of postrecommendation response regardless of the
number of previous exposures. Finance literature points out
that familiarity fuels investment (Huberman 2001); there-
fore, investors may have more confidence in buying stock in
a company that they are already familiar with when Cramer
recommends it. Similarly, marketing literature points out
that advertising for familiar brands attracts the largest
amount of attention to the advertised brand, which improves
subsequent brand memory (Pieters, Warlop, and Wedel
2002).
However, it is more likely that if the stock is well
known, investors will perceive fewer opportunities to beat
the market. If “noise traders” search for “unique” informa-
tion, they would be more likely to respond to recommenda-
tions of relatively unknown stocks. It is also possible that
recommendations for unknown stocks would be more effec-
tive because of the lack of preconceived notions about
them. Such findings would echo those of Winter (1973),
who finds that advertising can produce significant attitude
change only in people initially unfamiliar with the brand.
“Popular” stocks have the highest following by analysts
and the highest percentage ownership by institutional
investors and market makers.4 These informed investors are
the most likely candidates to exploit the market inefficien-
cies created by individual investors. These more liquid and
widely traded stocks also have low limits to arbitrage.
Therefore, we expect these stocks to be less susceptible to
recommendations. At the same time, “speculative” stocks
(e.g., stocks with higher turnover) are more susceptible to
recommendations because of the low institutional owner-
ship and higher overall volatility. Therefore, we control for
preevent market capitalization and turnover rates. We also
control for possible day-of-the-week effects and/or memory
decay by creating a set of weekday dummy variables and a
variable that captures the number of days between the rec-
ommendation and market opening.
Security prices could influence the size of inefficiencies
produced by the show. Investors may view “cheaper” stocks
as bargains. Even after controlling for market cap, which
would capture the potentially higher limits to arbitrage and
reduced liquidity associated with “cheaper” stocks, we
expect these stocks to be associated with higher inefficien-
cies. In addition, we control for whether Jim Cramer owns
the security in question (as a part of his charitable trust)
because this factor may raise some trust issues on the part
of investors. Finally, because trading mechanisms, volatil-
ity, and spreads differ across exchanges, we view the
exchange on which a given security is traded as a factor in
determining the size of market abnormality.
Data
Mad Money Data
We obtained the recommendations data from a
subscription-based Mad Money recap provider (i.e., an
independent Web site that captures the recommendations
appearing on Mad Money). This site supplies detailed daily
recaps of the show. This data source has several advantages:
(1) It operates independently from Mad Money; (2) it recaps
the recommendations in the order in which they appear on
the program (many other recap providers disseminate seg-
ment information in alphabetical order); and (3) the
provider creates special designations for some stocks,
which eliminates the need for the use of researcher judg-
ment in classifying the recommendations (e.g., a “Special
Mention” designation indicates that Jim Cramer discussed
the stock in detail).
We analyze recommendations across different segments
of the show. The Executive Interview segment is the most
detailed segment. With rare exceptions (which we exclude
from our data set because these instances do not translate
into buy recommendations), chief executive officers (CEOs)
provide an upbeat view of the market and a positive com-
pany outlook. Cramer opens and wraps the show with fairly
detailed discussions of select stocks. Therefore, we discuss
the recommendations that appear in the Opening (also
referred to as “First”) and Closing segments of the show in
greater detail. The Main segment is the segment during
which the stocks receive an average amount of attention;
our regression analysis treats these stocks as the base cate-
gory. In both the Lightning Round and the Sudden Death
segments, the host provides a fast-paced series of stock
picks (many of them are in response to viewers’ calls
regarding a recommendation on a specific security, and
Cramer quickly responds with his opinion). The difference
between the two segments is that the Lightning Round takes
place in the beginning of the show and Sudden Death
appears at the end. We exclude the “Am I Diversified?” seg-
ment of the program because the recommendations pro-
vided in this segment are specific to the caller portfolio.
We also include special designations by the recap
provider in the analysis because they represent the average
depth of recommendations associated with these groupings.
Some stocks are designated as “‘Mon Back” stocks (Jim
Cramer’s term for “C’mon back”), suggesting that Cramer
would back up the truck and load it up with stock. Some
stocks receive a “Special Mention” designation, indicating
that the stock received special attention from Cramer in
terms of time spent discussing it and the strength of his
opinion. These stocks are not the same as “Special Discus-
sion” stocks that Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams
(2007) mention. They use this term to describe non–
Lightning Round stocks. In our sample, Special Mention is
the designation given by the third party. These are the
stocks the recap provider recognizes as having received spe-
cial attention/endorsement from the host (they appear
across all segments of the show, including Lightning Round
and Sudden Death; however, they are underrepresented in
these segments). In addition, we capture a special designa-
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tion for the stocks that are part of Jim Cramer’s charitable
trust portfolio.
This study uses 8269 unambiguous buy recommenda-
tions for stocks trading on NASDAQ, AMEX, or NYSE that
aired between November 1, 2005, and July 31, 2007. We
used sell recommendations that aired during the same
period to estimate the variables pertaining to coverage
intensity, accuracy of previous recommendations, and rec-
ommendation reversals for buy recommendations. Of the
initial 8269 buy recommendations, we carried out our
regressions analysis on the 8160 observations that had
enough data for the estimation period, as specified in the
“Event Study” section.
Television Ratings Data
We purchased daily television ratings data for the Mad
Money show from Nielsen Media Research. The data cover
the same period as our stock picks database.
Financial Data
We obtained all financial data from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP). We carried out the event study–
related portion of the analysis using Eventus software. We
accessed both financial data and Eventus software through
Wharton Research Data Services.
Event Study
Event studies have become a popular tool in several fields
beyond finance (Balasubramanian, Mathur, and Thakur
2005; Kalaignanam, Shankar, and Varadarajan 2007). They
have been used to enhance the understanding of various
marketing domains, such as brand equity (Simon and Sulli-
van 1993), product placement (Wiles and Danielova 2009),
product innovation (e.g., Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis
2001; Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991; Eliashberg and
Robertson 1988; Sharma and Lacey 2004; Sood and Tellis
2009), celebrity endorsements (Agarwal and Kamakura
1995), and customer service (Balasubramanian, Mathur,
and Thakur 2005).
This approach uses the returns of the market portfolio as
a benchmark for normal returns and then detects any devia-
tions from it. We assume that the event (or recommenda-
tion) takes place at t = 0 (see Figure 2). We use a 100-day
estimation window (between days –145 and –46) to esti-
mate the normal or expected return and use the (–10, 20)
event window when we analyze the pattern of abnormal
5Portfolios are formed on the basis of book-to-market ratios.
returns associated with recommendations. We use this
broader event window to provide a direct comparison with
the only published study on Mad Money recommendations
by Neumann and Kenny (2007), who use the same event
window while demonstrating the overall pattern of abnor-
mal returns. Because Cramer makes his recommendations
after the close of the market at 6:00 P.M., we are particularly
interested in the next-day abnormal return, or the (1, 1)
event window. This approach is consistent with previous
research that points out that the impact of recommendations
is incorporated into prices within the first few trades during
the next trading session, and the best way to measure the
impact of media recommendations is to consider the (1, 1)
event window (e.g., Neumann and Kenny 2007; Pari 1987).
Following Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), we
define the abnormal return as the actual ex post return of the
security over the event window less the normal return of the
firm over the event window. The normal return is the
expected return if the event (recommendation) did not take
place. For each firm i and event date τ,
where Rit, and E[Rit] are the abnormal, actual, and
normal returns, respectively, and Xt is the conditioning
information to determine normal performance. We begin
with the most common variation of the normal return
model, known as the “market model” (for a detailed
description of applications within the marketing domain,
see Srinivasan and Bharadwaj 2004):
where
Rit = the return of stock i at time t,
Rmt = the monthly return on the CRSP equally
weighted index,
βi = a measure of stock i’s sensitivity to market
changes, and
εit = the error term.
However, it has been recommended to find a model that
best fits the market to make the event study more efficient
(Srinivasan and Bharadwaj 2004). Fama and French (1996)
propose a multifactor model that explains several asset-
pricing anomalies that exist in the market:
where the two additional factors are related to market
anomalies with respect to stocks of different market capi-
talization and value versus growth stocks:
SMBt = the difference between average returns of
small and large cap portfolios, and
HMLt = the difference between average returns on high
versus low B/M portfolios.5
The Fama–French three-factor model captures the majority
of market inefficiencies, but it fails to capture momentum
(Carhart 1997). Therefore, we incorporate Carhart’s (1997)
( ) ,3 R R s SMB h HMLit i i mt i t i t it= + + + +α β ε
( ) ,2 R Rit i i mt it= + +α β ε
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momentum factor. The resulting equation is known as the
four-factor model:
where UMDt is the average return on high-performing port-
folios less the average return on low-return portfolios.
Using the four-factor model, we define abnormal returns as
follows:
where and are generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) (1, 1) estimates of
αi, βi, si, hi, and ui.
We use a GARCH (1, 1) model (as suggested by Boller-
slev 1986) because it allows the conditional variance to
change as a function of the past-realized residuals and past
variances. Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) and
Corhay and Tourani-Rad (1996) present evidence that this
method provides more efficient estimators of regression
parameters and leads to more robust conclusions than the
traditional event study methodology.
In addition to estimating abnormal returns using Equa-
tion 5 over the (–0, 20) window, we examine the preshow
price buildup in the (–10, 0) window and the day following
the show (1, 1), and we evaluate the postreaction price drift
by studying the postevent window (2, 20). We also conduct
a volume-based event study, in which daily volume data are
centered on a single date for each firm (for details, see
Campbell and Wasley 1996). Volume event studies are simi-
lar to the market model event studies described in Equation
2, except that we use log-transformed volume data (i.e., log-
transformed percentages of shares outstanding) in place of
the returns.
Tests
Statistical Tests of Abnormal Returns
We use several tests to identify the significance of resulting
inefficiencies. We use a traditional time-series standard
deviation t-test (Brown and Warner 1985) to detect the sig-
nificance of the abnormal returns over a specified time
frame. We use various other tests to ensure that our results
are not driven by event-induced volatility. We use a stan-
dardized cross-sectional test that is better suited for detect-
ing return abnormalities than the conventional standard
deviation test in the presence of autocorrelation, event clus-
tering, and event-induced heteroskedasticity. In these set-
tings, it is more powerful than the Brown–Warner test while
being equally well specified (Boehmer, Musumeci, and
Poulsen 1991). The generalized sign test uses a normal
approximation to the binomial distribution and determines
whether the differences in the number of positive and nega-
tive returns are significant at the desired confidence level
(for details, see Cowan 1992; Sprent 1989).
Accessing the Impact of Volatility Changes
In addition to using tests that are robust to event-induced
volatility changes, we use a supplemental model that explic-
itly incorporates such volatility changes across different
uˆiˆ ,
ˆ
, ˆ , ˆ ,α βi i i is h
( ) ( ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ5 AR R R s SMB h HML u UMDit it i i mt i t i t i t= − + + + +α β ),
( ) ,4 R R s SMB h HML u UMDit i i mt i t i t i t it= + + + + +α β ε
event windows. Following Mathur and colleagues (2002),
we estimate a multivariate regression model (MRM) based
on Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regression method.
The following model explicitly recognizes the possible
shifts in volatility coefficients:
where
rt = the rate of return of the portfolio of firm returns
for day t;
rmkt = the rate of return on the market index;
= regression constant up to the announcement date;
= shift in regression constant in the postevent
period;
= systematic risk coefficient during the event
period;
= shift in systematic risk coefficient during the
(–10, 20) event period;
= shift in systematic risk coefficient during the
postevent period;
D0 = shift information dummy variable equal to 1 if
during the (–10, 20) period;
Ds = shift information dummy variable equal to 1 if
during the postevent period;
Di = shift information dummy variable for each event
window: (–10, 0), (1, 1), and (2, 20); and
= abnormal return coefficient for each event
window: (–10, 0), (1, 1), and (2, 20).
Again following Mathur and colleagues (2002), we use
White’s (1982) procedure to correct for heteroskedasticity
in residuals. If identified abnormal returns are not influ-
enced by event-induced volatility, the returns for different
event windows would be consistent across the stable beta
model and the MRM in which beta is allowed to shift across
volatility regimes.
Results of Event Study
Overall Patten of Abnormal Returns
We replicated previous research by examining the abnormal
price fluctuations associated with all the buy recommenda-
tions that appear on the show. Consistent with previous
research (e.g., Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams 2006,
2007; Lim and Rosario 2008), we find that stocks recom-
mended during the show experienced abnormal returns
before the recommendation (see Figure 3). We find a sig-
nificant abnormal return of .50% on the day following buy
recommendations (see Table 1); however, starting with Day
2, there is a significant drop in security prices because the
unwarranted sharp price increase triggers a profit-taking
sell-off by informed investors. It takes the stocks between
six and seven trading sessions to return to their prerecom-
mendation values. Although Jim Cramer himself warns
viewers against immediately acting on his recommenda-
tions and suggests that investors do their own due diligence
(Cramer 2006), the data show that investors immediately
“jump” on his recommendations and lose money (at least in
ˆCi
ˆ′′b
ˆ′b
ˆb
ˆ′a
aˆ
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Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Following Mad Money Buy Recommendations
TABLE 1
Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for Buy Recommendations (Fama–French Momentum Time-
Series Model, Equally Weighted Index, GARCH [1, 1] Error Structure)
*p < .001.
Notes: CDA = crude dependence adjustment.
Days N CAR
Positive:
Negative
Portfolio Time-
Series (CDA) t
Cross-Sectional
t
Generalized
Sign z
(–10, 0) 8160 .96% 4394:3766* 12.936* 9.269* 10.997*
(1, 1) 8160 .50% 4425:3735* 22.316* 16.587* 11.685*
(2, 20) 8159 –1.49% 3551:4608* –15.335* –13.720* –7.675*
the short run) as a result. Prices continue to fall far below
the prerecommendation levels to their pre-run-up values.
This indicates that the preshow run-up may not be driven by
fundamentals either and that Cramer’s endorsement (which
possibly brings more scrutiny to the stocks) drives stock
prices down closer to their intrinsic values (for daily abnor-
mal return information, see Table 2).
A legitimate question to ask is why the informed
investors do not immediately correct these large show-
induced inefficiencies. It is possible that institutional
investors pay attention to momentum considerations and
therefore are initially reluctant to short-sell the stocks that
have been climbing for a period of time. There are also
numerous constraints on the actions of the short-sellers:
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Senchack and Starks
(1993) address the effect of short-selling constraints on
price reactions. Short-sales constraints include direct mone-
tary costs of borrowing shares, the difficulty of establishing
a short position (e.g., insufficient pool of shares to borrow),
forced covering of short positions, potential short squeeze,
and so forth. These and other factors interfere with immedi-
ate price adjustments and prevent informed investors from
completely trading away inefficiencies induced by the
show. It may also be questioned why uninformed investors
allow the preevent run-up. We suspect that the run-up could
be caused by information leakage regarding a future recom-
mendation (as suggested by Engelberg, Sasseville, and
Williams 2006), or it could be attributable to contaminating
events taking place within the event window; we explore
this latter possibility subsequently.
Robustness Checks
We performed robustness checks on the equally weighted
four-factor model used in this study by varying model
specifications. Alterations in model specification (market,
three-, and four-factor), estimation method (ordinary least
squares or GARCH [1, 1]), and weighting scheme (value
versus equal weighting index) did not have a material influ-
ence on the findings. Neither did the length of the estima-
tion period (255 days versus 100 days).
Furthermore, we estimated the MRM described in
Equation 6. In particular, we investigated whether the
abnormal returns are driven by changes in volatility. The
results of the MRM model presented in Table 3 show that
abnormal returns are not influenced by changes in the sys-
tematic risk.
Neither the event nor the postevent beta shift coeffi-
cients are significant, indicating that there is no change in
underlying volatility. Moreover, we get the same estimate
for the abnormal return for the (1, 1) period compared with
the models with a stable beta, .5%, on the day following the
recommendation. This model also detects the significant
run-up during the (–10, 0) period and a significant decline
during the (2, 20) period. We also find a negative shift in the
intercept after the event, indicating that the negative trend of
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Day N MAR CAR
Portfolio Time-
Series (CDA) t
Standardized
Cross-
Sectional (z)
Generalized
Sign (z)
MAV
(Significance
of z)
–10 8160 .03% .03% 1.394† 1.251 1.623† 22.13%***
–9 8160 .02% .05% .782 .747 .204 20.69%***
–8 8160 .11% .16% 4.725*** 2.497** 1.889* 24.53%***
–7 8160 .06% .22% 2.532** 2.383** –.04 24.35%***
–6 8160 .10% .32% 4.521*** 3.621*** 2.310* 27.39%***
–5 8160 .08% .40% 3.591*** 3.261*** 2.465** 27.46%***
–4 8160 .03% .43% 1.193 1.033 –.328 27.13%***
–3 8160 .09% .52% 3.899*** 3.305*** 2.842** 31.82%***
–2 8160 .10% .62% 4.389*** 3.988*** 2.509** 34.04%***
–1 8160 .14% .76% 6.220*** 5.069*** 3.085** 38.36%***
0 8160 .22% .98% 9.660*** 7.043*** 5.036*** 55.12%***
1 8160 .50% 1.48% 22.316*** 16.587*** 11.685*** 73.13%***
2 8159 –.04% 1.44% –1.801* –1.734* –.893 43.34%***
3 8158 –.08% 1.36% –3.596*** –3.420*** –2.989** 36.90%***
4 8158 –.07% 1.29% –3.267*** –3.288*** –1.592† 34.32%***
5 8159 –.09% 1.20% –4.095*** –3.730*** –2.755** 31.11%***
6 8159 –.09% 1.11% –4.071*** –4.175*** –4.307*** 27.55%***
7 8159 –.17% .94% –7.510*** –7.367*** –4.839*** 26.57%***
8 8158 –.06% .88% –2.883** –2.893** –1.393† 22.31%***
9 8158 –.07% .81% –3.167*** –3.038** –3.853*** 24.57%***
10 8158 –.04% .77% –1.931* –1.844* –1.526† 24.31%***
11 8157 –.10% .67% –4.583*** –4.561*** –2.579** 21.44%***
12 8157 –.06% .61% –2.814** –2.663** –1.094 23.47%***
13 8158 –.05% .56% –2.391** –2.355** –1.659* 24.31%***
14 8158 –.05% .51% –2.227* –2.143* –1.437† 27.38%***
15 8157 –.06% .45% –2.628** –2.474** –1.293† 22.63%***
16 8157 –.07% .38% –3.355*** –3.374*** –2.912** 20.70%***
17 8157 –.11% .27% –4.924*** –4.776*** –4.796*** 22.94%***
18 8157 –.09% .18% –4.030*** –3.780*** –1.870* 23.27%***
19 8156 –.12% .06% –5.553*** –5.229*** –4.276*** 23.58%***
20 8155 –.05% .01% –2.027* –1.873* –.984 23.77%***
TABLE 2
Summary of Market Reaction to Buy Recommendations
†p < .10.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
Notes: MAR = mean abnormal return, CAR = cumulative abnormal returns, CDA = crude dependence adjustment, and MAV = mean abnormal
volume.
TABLE 3
Results of the MRM Model
*p < .001.
Constant Beta
Coefficients of the Information
Dummies
Overall Post Overall Event Post D(1, 1) D(–10, 0) D (2, 20)
Estimates .0008 –.001 1.32 –.054 –.045 .0050 .0007 –.001
T-statistic 29.57* –29.58* 36.95* –1.47 –1.24 16.39* 7.74* –18.17*
postrecommendation price adjustment persists beyond the
specified event window. This long-term price adjustment
could be related to the notion that viewers are calling about
high-sentiment stocks that are traditionally associated with
lower expected returns (Frazzini and Lamont 2008), and the
show simply triggers the value-adjustment mechanism asso-
ciated with these widely favored, overvalued securities. We
examined the long-term returns for these securities and
found a significant downward adjustment of –4.74% during
the six months following the recommendation.
Contaminated Events
We conducted an additional analysis to ensure that the mar-
ket reaction to Jim Cramer’s recommendations is not an
artifact of his or his viewers’ stock selection metrics (e.g.,
Cramer tends to recommend stocks just before the earnings
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announcements). To control for all the contaminating fac-
tors, we isolated a subsample of “clean” observations. We
opted for this approach rather than splitting the entire data
set into clean and contaminated subsamples because of the
time-consuming nature of identifying contaminated events.
We randomly selected 250 observations. We defined a con-
taminating event as any announcement of restructuring,
merger and acquisition activity, dividends, earnings
announcements, new product releases, new debt or equity
issuance, executive team changes, or other material changes
in company operations (e.g., announcement of a new gov-
ernment contract or the clearance of a regulatory stage by a
drug). A detailed analysis of press releases and Securities
and Exchange Commission regulatory filings identified 63
(of 250) uncontaminated observations.
An event analysis for this clean subsample of observa-
tions finds that there is no significant price run-up in the
(–10, 0) event window. The results of the contamination
study indicate that much of the preevent run-up is attributa-
ble to the selection criteria tied to contaminating events.
However, we are not able to conclude definitively that there
is no leakage before stock recommendation, because it is
possible that the leakages are strategically made around rec-
ommendations that involve contaminating events. Further
investigation is needed to completely rule out the leakage
possibility.
The abnormal market reaction for the (1, 1) event win-
dow in the clean subsample is .90% (t = 3.5, p < .01). This
larger abnormal reaction could have occurred because (1)
the impact of a recommendation is more easily identifiable
in lieu of other contaminating events and (2) the clean sub-
sample contains a larger proportion of small cap stocks
because, in general, large corporations had more contami-
nating events.
After the announcement, stocks begin to gravitate to
their preannouncement levels. It takes them seven trading
sessions to come back to their original price levels. Overall,
with the exception of the absence of the preevent run-up,
the clean sample results are consistent with our findings for
the overall sample. Not only does the market react to Mad
Money recommendations, but this reaction is also at least as
large or even larger in absence of contaminating events.
Volume Event Study Results
Table 2 presents a summary of the event-related daily trans-
action volume reaction. We find an abnormal increase in
trading volume on the trading day following the buy recom-
mendations. Recommended stocks are already experiencing
abnormal activity before the show, but the show further
stimulates trading activity. Note that for every day in the
event window (–10, 20), the mean abnormal volume is posi-
tive and significant (p < .0001). The day after the show airs,
stocks experience a significant (p < .0001) abnormal trading
volume increase of 73.13% (Figure 4 depicts daily abnor-
mal trading volume).
Buy Recommendations Across Different
Segments
Table 4 summarizes the event study results across different
show segments and special designations. The Main, Open-
ing, and Closing segments are associated with abnormal
returns of 1.07%, 1.23%, and .54%, respectively, on the day
following the show. The Main and Opening segments have
a greater impact than the Closing segment, which indicates
a possible presence of primacy effects or the viewers not
watching until the end of the program. Stocks in these more
elaborate segments are associated with significantly higher
next-day abnormal returns than stocks in the less elaborate
Lightning Round (.20%) and Sudden Death (.15%)
segments.
Surprisingly, the stocks featured in the CEO Interview
segment experience abnormal returns of approximately
.74% on the day of the show, which is followed by an .99%
abnormal return on the day following the show, indicating
73.13%
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Group Days N CAR
Positive:
Negative
Portfolio Time-
Series (CDA) t
Cross-
Sectional t
Generalized
Sign z
Opening
Segment
(–10, 0) 704 1.58% 411:293*** 6.574*** 4.360*** 5.534***
(+1, +1) 704 1.23% 463:241*** 17.085*** 10.635*** 9.456***
(+2, +20) 704 –1.32% 305:399** –4.199*** –3.945*** –2.463**
Main Segment (–10, 0) 1663 1.89% 1003:660*** 10.663*** 9.234*** 10.108***
(+1, +1) 1663 1.07% 962:701*** 20.007*** 11.484*** 8.095***
(+2, +20) 1662 –1.12% 747:915** –4.803*** –4.739*** –2.435**
Closing
Segment
(–10, 0) 689 .99% 359:330* 3.376*** 3.559*** 2.194*
(+1, +1) 689 .54% 400:289*** 6.113*** 5.988*** 5.321***
(+2, +20) 689 –.81% 306:383* –2.112* –2.181* –1.848*
CEO Interview (–10, 0) 132 2.11% 75:57* 3.849*** 2.881** 1.994*
(+1, +1) 132 .99% 87:45*** 5.984*** 4.752*** 4.085***
(+2, +20) 132 –1.66% 56:76† –2.308* –1.968* –1.315†
Lightning
Round
(–10, 0) 4807 .58% 2480:2327*** 6.270*** 4.040*** 5.450***
(+1, +1) 4807 .20% 2455:2352*** 7.251*** 6.529*** 4.728***
(+2, +20) 4807 –1.75% 2067:2740*** –14.411*** –12.109*** –6.477***
Sudden Death (–10, 0) 261 –.20% 116:145 –.503 –.493 –1.039
(+1, +1) 261 .15% 125:136 1.187 .912 .077
(+2, +20) 261 –1.14% 112:149† –2.144* –1.986* –1.534†
Special
Mention
(–10, 0) 2547 1.56% 1462:1085*** 10.305*** 9.137*** 9.636***
(+1, +1) 2547 1.27% 1632:915*** 27.828*** 18.277*** 16.379***
(+2, +20) 2547 –1.33% 1127:1420*** –6.678*** –6.844*** –3.652***
‘Mon Back (–10, 0) 215 –1.68% 92:123† –3.021** –3.019** –1.364†
(+1, +1) 215 .87% 139:76*** 5.190*** 5.319*** 5.056***
(+2, +20) 215 –2.17% 86:129* –2.962** –3.734*** –2.183*
†p < .10.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
Notes: CDA = crude dependence adjustment.
TABLE 4
Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) Across Different Segments and Designations
either that Cramer contacts the CEOs of companies on the
move or that show appearances require advanced schedul-
ing and information about the CEO’s visit gets leaked.
As we expected, stocks that the recap provider has clas-
sified as Special Mention get the biggest boost the day after
the show airs (1.27%). ‘Mon Back stocks also receive a
relatively large boost (.87%); however, investors are a bit
cautious despite the host’s strong endorsement because
these are often stocks that Cramer suggests have bottomed
out (indicating that some investors are too conservative to
use a “catching the falling knife” strategy).
Initial Versus Repeat Recommendations (H1)
We could not obtain a sample of initial recommendations
only, because the show started airing in March 2005 and our
sample starts in November 2005. However, we separated
our sample into the first observation for a particular security
versus repeat recommendations for the same security. The
first subsample contains all first-time recommendations that
aired during the observed period (we refer to this subsample
as “initial” recommendations). The results of the analysis
across the two subsamples appear in Table 5. Consistent
with H1, the next-day stock market increase for the initial
recommendations is 1.42%, which is significantly higher
than the .36% average for the repeat recommendations.6
Overall, our results provide strong support for H1.
6Mean comparison is significant at a 99.9% level.
Furthermore, the 1.42% estimate is conservative
because some of the recommendations in our initial recom-
mendation sample are repeat recommendations (Engelberg,
Sasseville, and Williams’s [2007] estimate for initial recom-
mendations was twice as large). Preshow price buildup is
more pronounced for initial-recommendation stocks (price
increases are probably the reason the stocks catch the view-
ers’ and host’s attention). In the (–10, 0) event window, ini-
tial (repeat) recommendations gain 2.02% (.80%). In addi-
tion to the next-day price increase and preshow buildup
differences, it takes initial-recommendation stocks much
longer (approximately 17 trading sessions) to bounce back
to the preshow levels (it takes repeat-recommendation
stocks only 5 to 6 sessions). Because of these differences
and factors related to historical accuracy and recommenda-
tions reversals (which are applicable to repeat recommenda-
tions only), we analyze the impact of message factors on
these two types of recommendations separately.
Regression Analysis
We test H2–H11 by estimating two regression equations, one
for the initial- and one for the repeat-recommendations
sample. Because our goal is to determine the factors that
drive the size of abnormalities, we estimate a regression
with the abnormal return on the first market day following
the buy recommendation (i.e., event window [1, 1]), ARi1 as
a dependent variable, and the variables corresponding to our
conceptual framework as the independent predictors. For all
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Days N Mean CAR
Positive:
Negative
Portfolio Time-
Series (CDA) t
Cross-Sectional
t
Generalized
Sign z
Initial Recommendations
(–10, 0) 1069 2.02% 633:436* 9.209* 4.868* 7.340*
(+1, +1) 1069 1.42% 683:386* 21.471* 12.293* 10.401*
(+2, +20) 1069 –1.51% 460:609* –5.215* –4.658* –3.251*
Repeat Recommendations
(–10, 0) 7091 .80% 3761:3330* 9.874* 7.897* 8.947*
(+1, +1) 7091 .36% 3742:3349* 14.744* 12.171* 8.495*
(+2, +20) 7090 –1.49% 3091:3999* –14.041* –12.926* –6.971*
TABLE 5
Initial Versus Repeat Buy Recommendations
*p < .001.
Notes: CAR = cumulative abnormal return. CDA = crude dependence adjustment.
initial buy recommendations, we specify the following
model:
For all repeat buy recommendations separately, we estimate
the following model:
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Independent variables include factors related to information
processing (e.g., recency and primacy dummy variables,
variables representing overall and Standard Industrial
Classification–specific [SIC-specific] clutter), the show’s
reach, and whether the recommendation had a Special Men-
tion designation. In addition, we capture the date of recom-
mendation, the exchange on which the security was traded
at the time of recommendation, share price, turnover, and
the market cap characteristics associated with a particular
security. For repeat recommendations, we also include
variables that represent the accuracy of the host’s previous
predictions. Appendix A presents the summary of all the
variables used in this study. A correlation table for Model 6
(7) is in Appendix B (C). Descriptive statistics are in
Appendix D.
Results of Regression Analysis
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the regression results for Models
6 and 7. In addition to the specified model, we estimated
models that omitted the Special Mention designation as an
explanatory variable. We do not present the results of these
models here (because these models are inferior to the mod-
els we summarize based on the incremental F-test [p <
.001]), but it is worth noting that they support the presence
of strong between-segment differences that disappear when
the Special Mention variable is introduced.
Information-Processing Effects
H2 and H3, which deal with primacy and recency effects,
are both supported. We find convincing evidence for the
existence of primacy effects because they are significant
(p < .001) for both initial and repeat recommendations. We
also find evidence of a significant (p < .05) recency effect in
the repeat-recommendations sample. Similar to Pieters and
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Bijmolt (1997), we find that primacy effects are stronger
than recency effects.
Clutter. There is some support for H4 because overall
information clutter marginally contributes to reducing the
size of the market inefficiency following repeat buy recom-
mendations (p < .10). However, overall clutter is not signifi-
cant for initial recommendations. In addition, contrary to
H5, clutter from similar (same SIC header code) picks is
positively associated with the size of the inefficiency (p <
.02). Although this finding is surprising from an
information-processing point of view, it could be explained
by the host’s tendency to talk about potentially attractive
segments and to bring up several stocks he finds particularly
promising. These positive remarks about the industry may
create elaboration rather than clutter.
Message length. There is strong support for H6, regard-
ing the relationship between message length and the size of
the abnormal return. In both regressions, when a recom-
mendation is given a Special Mention designation, the
resulting abnormal return is significantly higher (p < .001).
In the initial-buy regression, none of the segment variables
are significant, indicating that only message length, and not
the segment of the show in which it appears or the source of
the pick (i.e., user- or host-generated), has an impact. In
contrast, in the repeat-buy regressions, there is a positive
coefficient for the Lightning Round and Sudden Death seg-
7This is not surprising, given that Sudden Death is a new seg-
ment that was designed to stop the viewers from changing the
channel before the end of the program.
8A possible explanation for only a marginal effect could be that
Mad Money has a group of hardcore followers who are responsible
for the bulk of the price movements. The size of the occasional
viewer segment (that fluctuates in response to other programming
available) may not have a very strong effect on stock prices. This
matter requires further investigation.
ments (which investors tend to favor) and a negative coeffi-
cient for the Closing segment.7 Therefore, after controlling
for the amount of attention given to each stock, we pick up
signs of viewer preference for different segment formats. In
summary, the strong impact of being a Special Mention
stock supports H6, that more elaborate recommendations
are associated with larger market inefficiencies.
Reach
We also find some evidence on the size of audience effects.
The Number of Viewers variable is marginally significant in
the repeat-recommendation model.8 This provides marginal
support for H7.
Source Credibility and Learning Effects
There is mixed evidence for H8, that global learning is tak-
ing place. We find that the time variable is significant (p <
Unstandardized
Coefficient
Standardized
Coefficient
Collinearity
Statistics
Variable Hypothesis B SE Beta t-Value Significance Tolerance VIF
Constant 3.345 1.211 2.762 .006
Primacy H2 .014 .003 .123 4.246 .000 .876 1.141
Recency H3 .003 .004 .024 .814 .416 .828 1.208
Overall Clutter H4 .000 .000 –.022 –.748 .455 .845 1.183
SIC Clutter H5 .001 .000 .066 2.363 .018 .932 1.074
Special Mention H6 .023 .005 .290 4.514 .000 .177 5.640
‘Mon Back H6 –.001 .009 –.003 –.105 .916 .910 1.099
CEO Segment H6 –.014 .010 –.039 –1.413 .158 .951 1.052
Lightning Round H6 .002 .005 .032 .518 .605 .187 5.341
Sudden Death H6 –.006 .009 –.020 –.636 .525 .756 1.322
Closing Segment H6 –.005 .007 –.022 –.740 .459 .799 1.252
Opening Segment H6 .004 .005 .025 .720 .472 .622 1.608
Viewers H7 .010 .035 .008 .270 .787 .793 1.261
Time H8 –.000 .000 –.102 –2.718 .007 .523 1.913
Preevent Price Control –.000 .000 –.113 –3.646 .000 .764 1.309
Preevent Turnover Control .088 .034 .071 2.619 .009 .989 1.011
Log(Market Cap) Control –.004 .001 –.159 –4.461 .000 .576 1.737
NYSE Control –.004 .002 –.056 –1.802 .072 .748 1.337
AMEX Control .007 .008 .025 .887 .375 .948 1.055
Cramer Owns Control .008 .008 .028 1.003 .316 .952 1.050
Memory Decay Control –.001 .001 –.015 –.534 .594 .922 1.084
Model Fit
R2 .233
Adjusted R2 .219
F-value 15.938
Sig. (F) .000
Notes: VIF = variance inflation factor.
TABLE 6
Regression Results for Initial Buy Recommendations
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TABLE 7
Regression Results for Repeat Buy Recommendations
Unstandardized
Coefficient
Standardized
Coefficient
Collinearity
Statistics
Variable Hypothesis B SE Beta t-Value Significance Tolerance VIF
Constant .053 .316 .169 .865
Primacy H2 .004 .001 .045 3.799 .000 .928 1.077
Recency H3 .002 .001 .027 2.232 .026 .877 1.140
Overall Clutter H4 –.000 .000 –.020 –1.701 .089 .919 1.089
SIC Clutter H5 .000 .000 .019 1.526 .127 .881 1.136
Special Mention H6 .012 .001 .220 8.274 .000 .188 5.321
‘Mon Back H6 .003 .002 .022 1.856 .064 .983 1.017
CEO Segment H6 .000 .002 .000 .023 .982 .880 1.136
Lightning Round H6 .004 .001 .085 3.627 .000 .242 4.130
Sudden Death H6 .004 .002 .029 2.142 .032 .707 1.415
Closing Segment H6 –.004 .001 –.053 –3.245 .001 .501 1.994
Opening Segment H6 .002 .001 .019 1.188 .235 .523 1.914
Viewers H7 .017 .010 .024 1.765 .078 .736 1.359
Time H8 –.000 .000 –.001 –.092 .927 .573 1.746
Return Since Last H9 .079 .025 .040 3.133 .002 .811 1.233
Recommendation
Reversal H10 .003 .001 .044 3.706 .000 .955 1.048
Return Since 
Last ×
Recommendation
Reversal H11 .282 .067 .053 4.209 .000 .843 1.186
Preevent Price Control –.000 .000 –.019 –1.526 .127 .861 1.162
Preevent Turnover Control .028 .011 .030 2.553 .011 .966 1.035
Log(Market Cap) Control –.002 .000 –.123 –9.055 .000 .721 1.387
NYSE Control –.001 .001 –.025 –1.912 .056 .805 1.242
AMEX Control .002 .002 .011 .923 .356 .936 1.068
Cramer Owns Control .001 .001 .009 .739 .460 .933 1.072
Coverage Intensity Control –.002 .004 –.007 –.575 .565 .968 1.033
Memory Decay Control .000 .000 .014 1.170 .242 .926 1.079
Model Fit
R2 .064
Adjusted R2 .060
F-value 19.98
Sig. (F) .0000
Notes: VIF = variance inflation factor.
.01) and negative in the initial-recommendation model. This
suggests that the reaction to Cramer’s initial buy recom-
mendations decreases over time, which is consistent with
the idea that viewers learn that there is some wealth redistri-
bution. However, we do not find a significant effect for time
in the repeat-recommendation model. Over time, there is an
increase in the number of stocks recommended by Cramer
in a single show, and individual stocks receive less atten-
tion. Therefore, there is some collinearity between the Spe-
cial Mention, time, and individual segment variables, but
none of the variance inflation factors exceed 10 (the cutoff
point that Marguardt [1970] suggests for identifying serious
collinearity problems).
In contrast, there is strong evidence in support of H9,
H10, and H11, which deal with repeat recommendations on
individual stocks. For H9, if Cramer’s track record for a par-
ticular security is strong (i.e., larger positive returns on rec-
ommended buys or steeper stock price declines for recom-
mended sells), investors are significantly more likely to pay
attention to his subsequent recommendations for that stock.
This is evident in the significant Return Since Last Recom-
mendation variable in the repeat-buy recommendation
regressions. Consistent with H10, recommendation reversals
are associated with larger abnormal returns, indicating that
viewers respond to such reversals strongly. Furthermore, in
support of H11, investor return from the last recommenda-
tion for a particular equity and its interaction with recom-
mendation reversal are both significant. These results indi-
cate that investors pay attention to Cramer’s track record on
individual stocks because the response to his recommenda-
tion is contingent on the accuracy of his previous prediction
for the same security.
Other Significant Findings
The size of the share price (i.e., preevent share price) is
negatively associated with abnormal returns, indicating that
investors are “bargain hunting” while watching the show.
This finding persists even after we control for other
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variables, such as market cap. Similar to previous research,
we find that market cap is inversely related to the size of the
abnormal return. In addition, we find that different markets
are associated with different sizes of inefficiencies. Stocks
traded on the NYSE have marginally lower inefficiencies
than NASDAQ stocks. These differences could potentially
be linked to differences in the security types listed on these
exchanges, levels of idiosyncratic volatility associated with
these stocks, differences in effective spread sizes, and short-
sales rules governing different exchanges. However, identi-
fying the sources of this variation is beyond the scope of
this project.
Managerial Implications
Summary
We document several inefficiencies/arbitrage opportunities
that are created by televised stock recommendations. These
inefficiencies are of interest to the managers of publicly
traded companies affected by Mad Money recommenda-
tions because they may influence stock repurchase
decisions.
We assumed that the response to Jim Cramer’s recom-
mendations might differ from the response to advertise-
ments because many viewers are actively looking for rec-
ommendations rather than passively watching commercials.
We find considerable evidence that viewers are actively
looking for recommendations. First, rather than a threshold
or inverted U-shaped response curve to the number of
advertisements, initial recommendations generated stronger
reactions than subsequent recommendations for the same
stock. Second, this seems to be a high-involvement pur-
chase. For initial recommendations, it appears that rather
than focusing on better-known stocks with large capitaliza-
tions, investors are looking for niche/small cap stocks
because the size of the next-day stock price abnormality is
inversely related to the size of the preevent market capitali-
zation. However, this larger inefficiency could also be
explained by the higher limits to arbitrage associated with
small cap stocks. In addition, stocks with higher turnover
rates generated higher next-day price increases than stocks
with lower-turnover/higher-institutional ownership. Finally,
lower-priced stocks had greater abnormal returns following
initial recommendations, indicating that naive investors
could be bargain hunting. This finding underscores the irra-
tionality of naive investor actions and suggests that pricing-
related considerations could inform finance models of
investor behavior.
Despite these differences between response to tradi-
tional advertising and to Cramer’s recommendations, we
find numerous similarities. Although a substantial fraction
of the audience is looking for recommendations, any indi-
vidual recommendation is still subject to many of the same
communication obstacles as advertisements in terms of get-
ting heard. We found strong evidence of both recency and
primacy effects in investor response to stock recommenda-
tions. Primacy had a greater impact than recency (and
affected both initial and repeat recommendations, while
only repeat recommendations were affected by the recency
effect), possibly indicating that search is active and that
when a satisfactory recommendation is found, the search
ends. We found that overall clutter had a marginally nega-
tive impact on the reaction to repeat recommendations but
had no effect for initial recommendations. This indicates
that initial recommendations can cut through the clutter.
Contrary to expectations, industry clutter actually increased
viewer response. We assume that this was due to the
increased visibility of all recommendations in that industry.
In addition, recommendations that were given greater
emphasis had a greater response than others.
We find that source credibility has a significant impact
on the response to subsequent recommendations. There is
evidence of global learning because the decrease in
response to Cramer’s recommendations over time is consis-
tent with viewers learning the general pattern of abnormal
returns shown in Figure 3. However, we also find that
investors track the host’s performance for particular securi-
ties when making purchase decisions because response to a
particular stock is significantly affected by the success of
past recommendations for the same stock, especially if
there was a reversal of the previous recommendation.
Implications
When investors are looking for recommendations, but not a
specific stock recommendation, the situation could be simi-
lar to when a person has an interest in a product or service
class but does not have a specific brand in mind. This simi-
larity should make the findings of this study relevant to the
emergent class of well-targeted advertisements (i.e., adver-
tisements that are served to consumers who have expressed
some interest in a particular product category). Our findings
suggest that it is not enough to appropriately target a mes-
sage to a certain viewer; its chances of being attended to
and acted on are significantly greater with proper place-
ment, reduced clutter, and better execution. For example, in
targeted online advertising campaigns, marketers need to
make sure not only that the message is going to the right
people but also that it is appropriately positioned among the
competitive entries and designed in a way that grabs con-
sumer attention and cuts through the clutter.
The findings are also relevant to the domain of search-
engine marketing (e.g., Google’s AdWords), browsing-
history-based behavioral targeting (e.g., Front Porch,
NebuAd, Phorm), and the effectiveness of recommendation
lists and advice columns (e.g., the Amazon Daily blog) that
are becoming integral parts of Internet shopping portals.
Even in such high-involvement environments in which con-
sumers are presented with information relevant to their
needs, information-processing-related effects influence
their purchasing decisions. According to Microsoft research
(i.e., Richardson, Dominowska, and Ragno 2007), higher-
positioned advertisements receive higher clickthrough rates
as a result of visual attention differences. Our research
shows that additional information-processing effects could
also have a bearing on the relative effectiveness of search
and other types of Internet advertising; namely, there seems
to be a connection with banner advertising such that the
presentation order must be considered when trying to deter-
mine the effectiveness of an advertisement.
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Of interest to search marketers and online advertisers is
the notion that in competitive, high-involvement environ-
ments in which people are trying to find a unique product,
repeated exposure may not produce the desired results.
Broader settings that can benefit from this insight are Inter-
net art, designer clothing, and unique jewelry auctions. For
example, Portero.com is an auction site dedicated to selling
certified “preowned” luxury designer items. The site pub-
lishes a blog listing several items designated as great finds.
According to our findings, such blogs should be updated
frequently and with items not mentioned elsewhere on the
Web site. Bidz.com is a site that sells closeout and discon-
tinued jewelry with live auctions starting every five sec-
onds. In such high-involvement, high-paced settings, rec-
ommendations should be made out of the pool of items not
yet considered by the bidders.
It is instructive to compare the results of this study with
those of Tellis and Johnson (2007). In their event analysis of
abnormal returns to stock prices of firms whose products
were reviewed by the Wall Street Journal, a positive product
review by Walter Mossberg provided a larger abnormal
next-day return that was sustained in the following days.
This suggests that if CEOs introduce credible, positive, new
information, its impact on stock returns could be similar to
that of an objective product review. If an appearance does
not provide any new information (similar to most appear-
ances on Mad Money), its effects dissipate quickly.
It might be better to restrict public relations activities to
general business shows and communication with analysts
and not to shows such as Mad Money, for which viewers are
looking for stock picks. To create a sustainable stock price
increase, the appearances should concentrate on the new
developments that are material (i.e., affect a company’s
long-term potential and future cash flows) because the mar-
ket does not reward the public relations efforts that are not
based on fundamentals. At the same time, there could be
some positive side effects associated with Mad Money
appearances because increased scrutiny may reduce the cost
of management/market information asymmetry, which, in
efficient markets, is ultimately borne by the firm (Myers
and Majluf 1984). In addition, these appearances might cre-
ate additional brand equity, especially when it comes to
relatively unknown consumer goods (viewers could be
inclined to try the brands marketed by the companies men-
tioned on the show), but this aspect needs further
investigation.
This study also has implications for marketers and pol-
icy makers in the area of complex product offerings in
which consumers have limited ability to comprehend prod-
ucts’ value or efficacy (e.g., investments, health care, educa-
tion). Our findings suggest that despite the high-
involvement environment associated with these settings,
consumers rely on heuristics in making their decisions
because they have limited ability to perform their own due
diligence. As a result, they blindly follow the “experts” and
are especially susceptible to various information-processing
biases.
From a public policy perspective, this study finds that
naive investors pick investment opportunities without doing
much due diligence because they respond to Mad Money
stock recommendations as soon as the markets open on the
day following the broadcast. Furthermore, their investment
decisions are influenced by various information-processing
considerations that are not tied to company fundamentals,
making them extremely vulnerable to manipulation. By
separating the contaminated events from the clean events
and providing evidence of price run-up only before the con-
taminated events, we question the findings of prior studies
that attribute the price run-up effect to information leakage.
To resolve the issue of information leakage, we advocate
further inquiry into the price run-up in the contaminated
sample to disentangle the effects of contaminating events
from information leakage, if any.
Limitations and Further Research
This study evaluates a single financial recommendation
show. This limitation is brought about because Mad Money
is the only program clearly targeted at a naive audience for
which we could obtain a suitable data set. Our preliminary
research shows that in more sophisticated types of program-
ming, inefficiencies are much smaller and driven primarily
by market infrastructure considerations and limits to arbi-
trage (e.g., turnover, market cap, the exchange on which the
security is traded), though some factors related to recom-
mendation credibility and intensity (e.g., analyst consensus,
number of panelists supporting a recommendation) are also
relevant. Further research should examine the continuum of
available programming and provide a framework for identi-
fying the most relevant factors that lead to the size of abnor-
mal returns in different types of financial programming.
This study shows that financial managers and scholars
need to draw on the knowledge generated within the mar-
keting field when predicting individual investor reactions to
messages pertaining to financial securities. Marketing lit-
erature documents a vast array of consumer behavior pat-
terns that can significantly improve the traditional models
of investor behavior that rely on investor rationality.
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Variable Hypothesis Description Special Details
Abnormal Return Dependent
variable
ARi1 or next-trading-day abnormal return for stock i.
Initial H1 Dummy variable taking on a value of 1. Variable is used to sort the
database into the initial versus
unique recommendation
samples.
Primacyij0 H2 Dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if stock i was the
first stock recommended in its segment j.
Recencyij0 H3 Dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if stock i was the
last stock recommended in its segment j.
Overall Clutter0 H4 The number of all positive and negative
recommendations made on the same event show.
SIC Clutterid0 H5 The number of competing recommendations for stock i
with the same SIC code d made on the same event
show.
SIC grouping is based on two-
digit SIC code header.
Segmentij0 H6 Dummy variable array with values taking on a value of 1
if recommendation for stock i aired during segment j on
t = 0. “Discussion” (also referred to as “Main”) segment
stocks and stocks with no segment designation serve as
a reference category.
Array columns are CEO
Interview, Lightning Round,
Opening Segment, Closing
Segment, and Sudden Death.
Special Mentioni0 H6 Dummy variable indicating whether stock i received a
Special Mention designation on the show at t = 0.
‘Mon Backi0 H6 Dummy variable indicating whether stock i received this
designation on the show at t = 0.
Viewers0
H7 Correspond to Nielsen estimates for the audience size
for the event date, t = 0.
Timei0 H8 Date on which recommendation took place; attempts to
capture the investor learning.
Return Since 
Lasti(t – 1)
H9 Preevent daily return if the last recommendation was
followed; sell stocks are considered sold short.
Recommendation
Reversali0
H10 Dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if Cramer
changed his recommendation for stock i at t = 0.
Interaction of this and Return
Since Last variables is used to
test H11.
Share Pricei(t – 1) Control Per share price for company i before the event 
Turnoveri(t – 1) Control Turnover ratio of stock i before the recommendation. Number of shares traded over
number of shares outstanding.
Market Capi(t – 1) Control Market cap of company i before the recommendation. Log-transformed in regression
equations.
NYSEi1, AMEXi1,
NADAQi1
Control Market on which a given security i is traded. NASDAQ serves as a
reference category.
Cramer Ownsi0 Control Cramer’s charitable trust owns a particular stock i at the
time of recommendation.
Coverage
Intensityi0
Control Intensity of coverage for stock i before the given event
at t = 0.
Memory Decayi1a Control Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if Number of
Days Since Recommendation for stock i until market
opens on t = 1.
APPENDIX A
Variables
aWe also tried capturing day of the week and holiday break effects. Friday variable in the Weekday array and Memory Decay variables are
highly correlated; therefore, we explored using just the decay variable versus using day-of-week variables and the variable called Holiday,
which signifies that the next work day after recommendation falls on one of the official exchange holidays. Neither of the methods produced
any significant results in terms of influencing the next-day abnormal return. For simplicity of exposition, the final model uses the Memory
Decay variable only.
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1. Abnormal Return 1.00
2. Primacy .20 1.00
3. Recency .10 –.06 1.00
4. Overall Clutter –.03 –.04 –.07 1.00
5. SIC Clutter .09 –.05 –.04 .14 1.00
6. Special Mention .36 .24 .29 –.07 .01 1.00
7. ‘Mon Back .04 .03 .04 –.05 –.03 .12 1.00
8. CEO Segment –.01 –.04 .14 –.09 .02 .11 –.01 1.00
9. Lightning Round –.30 –.27 –.31 .01 –.04 –.86 –.10 –.10 1.00
10. Sudden Death –.06 .09 .03 .00 .02 –.10 –.02 –.01 –.14 1.00
11. Closing Segment .02 .11 –.04 –.08 –.08 .21 –.02 .04 –.18 –.02 1.00
12. Opening Segment .10 .09 .22 –.08 –.07 .32 .27 –.03 –.27 –.03 –.04 1.00
13. Viewers .05 –.04 –.03 –.01 .07 .01 –.11 .00 .04 –.09 –.07 –.24 1.00
14. Time –.04 .11 .11 –.30 –.14 .06 .13 .03 –.10 .18 .27 .42 –.39 1.00
15. Share Price(t – 1) –.25 –.05 –.05 .05 –.03 –.14 –.07 –.04 .10 .03 –.01 –.07 –.02 –.04 1.00
16. Turnover(t – 1) .07 –.01 –.01 .05 .02 –.02 .00 .00 .03 .00 –.01 –.01 –.03 .03 –.03 1.00
17. Log(Market Cap) –.32 –.12 –.10 .11 –.01 –.29 –.07 –.01 .23 –.02 –.04 –.09 .03 –.18 .47 –.05 1.00
18. NYSE –.22 –.09 .01 .04 –.12 –.12 .01 .00 .08 .03 –.01 –.03 –.03 –.02 .27 –.04 .45 1.00
19. AMEX .06 .01 –.03 –.02 –.01 .02 –.02 –.02 –.02 –.02 .06 .02 .00 .10 –.08 .00 –.12 –.18 1.00
20. Cramer Owns –.02 –.05 .00 .07 .01 –.05 –.02 –.01 .02 –.02 –.02 .00 .00 –.09 .08 .00 .16 .00 .03 1.00
21. Memory Decay –.01 .00 .05 .03 –.09 .03 –.06 .02 .04 –.07 .05 .02 –.13 –.04 .06 –.02 –.02 .01 –.03 –.02 1.00
Notes: Correlations significant at 95% confidence level are in bold.
APPENDIX B
Correlation Table for Initial Buy Recommendations
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Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1. Abnormal Return 1.00
2. Primacy .06 1.00
3. Recency .05 –.03 1.00
4. Overall Clutter –.02 –.09 –.07 1.00
5. SIC Clutter .01 –.02 –.04 .14 1.00
6. Special Mention .14 .16 .19 .04 –.03 1.00
7. ‘Mon Back .02 .04 .00 –.04 –.04 .02 1.00
8. CEO Segment .03 .01 .23 –.05 –.04 .20 .01 1.00
9. Lightning Round –.09 –.21 –.25 –.04 .04 –.79 .00 –.16 1.00
10. Sudden Death –.01 .07 .09 .03 –.01 –.11 .01 –.02 –.23 1.00
11. Closing Segment .02 .08 .10 .03 –.06 .49 .00 .25 –.39 –.06 1.00
12. Opening Segment .08 .09 .05 .08 .01 .47 .03 –.02 –.37 –.06 –.10 1.00
13. Viewers .03 –.03 –.04 –.16 .07 –.08 –.03 –.02 .14 –.05 –.12 –.12 1.00
14. Time –.03 .09 .10 .04 –.10 .10 .07 .05 –.25 .10 .26 .26 –.47 1.00
15. Return Since Last .08 –.01 –.01 .07 .07 .01 –.04 .02 –.02 –.02 .00 .01 .02 –.02 1.00
16. Recommendation
Reversal .07 .01 .00 .01 .01 .02 –.04 .01 –.03 .00 –.02 .01 .00 .00 .01 1.00
17. Return Since 
Last ×
Recommendation
Reversal .08 –.02 –.01 .02 .03 .00 –.01 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .01 .00 .36 .14 1.00
18. Share Price(t – 1) –.06 .00 .01 .01 .00 .04 .00 –.04 –.05 –.01 .03 .06 –.02 .08 –.05 –.09 –.02 1.00
19. Turnover(t – 1) .05 .01 .01 .00 .01 .01 .00 .00 –.01 –.01 –.01 .01 .03 .00 .16 .01 .01 –.01 1.00
20. Log(Market Cap) –.15 .00 –.05 .03 .07 –.01 .02 –.08 –.04 .01 .00 .09 –.05 .11 –.08 –.09 –.02 .35 –.05 1.00
21. NYSE –.07 .01 –.01 –.02 –.24 .02 –.02 –.01 –.05 .01 .01 .03 –.06 .08 –.06 –.02 –.03 .04 –.01 .29 1.00
22. AMEX .03 –.01 .00 –.01 .00 –.03 .00 .00 .04 .00 –.02 –.04 .03 –.04 .01 .00 –.02 –.10 .00 –.15 –.22 1.00
23. Cramer Owns –.03 .00 –.01 .00 –.01 .02 .02 –.03 .00 –.02 .01 .01 .01 –.02 –.04 –.11 –.01 .10 –.01 .23 .06 –.02 1.00
24. Coverage Intensity .01 –.02 .02 .04 .03 .02 –.01 .02 –.02 –.02 –.01 –.02 .00 –.08 .13 –.02 .00 –.02 .00 –.05 –.01 .02 –.01 1.00
25. Memory Decay .01 –.03 –.03 .09 –.07 .11 –.02 –.02 –.05 –.09 .16 .04 –.17 .06 .01 .00 .00 .01 –.01 –.01 .02 –.02 .00 .00 1.00
Notes: Correlations significant at 95% confidence level are in bold.
APPENDIX C
Correlation Table for Repeat Buy Recommendations
264 / Journal of Marketing, November 2009
Agarwal Jagdish and Wagner A. Kamakura (1995), “The Eco-
nomic Worth of Celebrity Endorsers: An Event Study Analy-
sis,” Journal of Marketing, 59 (July), 56–62.
Alvarez, Michael R. and Jonathan Nagler (2002), “Party System
Compactness: Measurement and Consequences,” Political
Analysis, 12 (1), 46–62.
American Marketing Association (1960), Definitions: A Glossary
of Marketing Terms. Chicago: American Marketing
Association.
Anand, Punam and Brian Sternthal (1990), “Ease of Message Pro-
cessing as a Moderator of Repetition Effects in Advertising,”
Journal of Marketing Research, 27 (August), 345–53.
Balasubramanian, Siva K., Ike Mathur, and Ramendra Thakur
(2005), “The Impact of High-Quality Firm Achievements on
Shareholder Value: Focus on Malcolm Baldrige and J.D. Power
and Associates Awards,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing
Science, 33 (4), 413–22.
Barber, Brad M., Reuven Lehavy, and Maureen McNichols
(2001), “Can Investors Profit From the Prophets? Security
Analyst Recommendations and Stock Returns,” Journal of
Finance, 56 (2), 531–63.
——— and Terrance Odean (2008), “All That Glitters: The Effect
of Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual
and Institutional Investors,” The Review of Financial Studies,
21 (2), 785–818.
Barberis, Nicholas and Richard Thaler (2003), “A Survey of
Behavioral Finance,” in The Handbook of the Economics of
Finance, Vol. 1, George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris, and
Rene Stulz, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1053–1128.
Bettman, James R. (1979), An Information Processing Theory of
Consumer Choice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Blair, Margaret H. (1987), “An Empirical Investigation of Adver-
tising Wearin and Wearout,” Journat of Advertising Research,
27 (December–January), 45–50.
Boehmer, Ekkehart, Jim Musumeci, and Annett B. Poulsen (1991),
“Event Study Methodology Under Conditions of Event-
Induced Variance,” Journal of Financial Economics, 30 (2),
253–72.
Bollerslev, Tim (1986), “Generalized Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity,” Journal of Econometrics, 31 (3), 307–327.
Brown, Stephen and Michael L. Rothschild (1993), “Reassessing
the Impact of Television Advertising Clutter,” Journal of Con-
sumer Research, 20 (1), 138–46.
——— and Jerold Warner (1985), “Using Daily Stock Returns:
The Case of Event Studies,” Journal of Financial Economics,
14 (1), 3–31.
Burke, Raymond R. and Thomas K. Srull (1988), “Competitive
Interference and Consumer Memory for Advertising,” Journal
of Consumer Research, 15 (1), 55–68.
Busse, Jeffrey and Clifton Green (2002), “Market Efficiency in
Real Time,” Journal of Financial Economics, 65 (3), 415–37.
Campbell, Cynthia J. and Charles E. Wasley (1996), “Measuring
Abnormal Trading Volume for Samples of NYSE/ASE and
NASDAQ Securities Using Parametric and Nonparametric Test
Statistics,” Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 33
(1), 73–92.
Campbell, John Y., Andrew W. Lo, and A. Craig MacKinlay
(1997), “Event-Study Analysis,” in The Econometrics of Finan-
Initial Recommendations Repeat Recommendations
Variable M SD N M SD N
Abnormal Return .0142 .038 1069 .0035 .025 7091
Primacy .12 .329 1069 .096 .295 7091
Recency .10 .303 1069 .109 .312 7091
Overall Clutter 35.66 8.355 1069 34.382 8.675 7091
SIC Clutter 5.00 4.087 1069 5.300 4.254 7091
Special Mention .39 .488 1069 .300 .458 7091
‘Mon Back .01 .118 1069 .028 .166 7091
CEO Segment .01 .105 1069 .017 .129 7091
Lightning Round .54 .499 1069 .597 .491 7091
Sudden Death .02 .125 1069 .034 .182 7091
Closing Segment .03 .163 1069 .093 .291 7091
Opening Segment .06 .239 1069 .090 .286 7091
Viewers .13 .033 1069 .125 .034 7091
Time 04/27/2006 182 00:42:18 1069 10/06/2006 184 07:25:02 7091
Return Since Last
N.A.
.002 .013 7091
Recommendation Reversal .135 .342 7091
Return Since Last × Recommendation Reversal .000 .005 7091
Share Price(t – 1) 39.26 28.733 1069 53.799 56.406 7091
Turnover(t – 1) .00 .031 1069 .001 .027 7091
Log(Market Cap) 14.70 1.550 1069 16.142 1.713 7091
NYSE .61 .489 1069 .620 .486 7091
AMEX .02 .139 1069 .028 .166 7091
Cramer Owns .02 .129 1069 .110 .313 7091
Coverage Intensity N.A. .007 .082 7091
Memory Decay 1.44 .859 1069 1.442 .855 7091
Notes: N.A. = not applicable.
APPENDIX D
Descriptive Statistics
REFERENCES
Impact of Mad Money Stock Recommendations / 265
cial Markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
149–80.
Carhart, Mark (1997), “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Perfor-
mance,” Journal of Finance, 52 (1), 57–82.
Chan, Louis K., Josef Lakonishok, and Theodore Sougiannis
(2001), “The Stock Market Valuation of Research and Devel-
opment Expenditures,” Journal of Finance, 56 (December),
2431–56.
Chaney, Paul K., Timothy M. Devinney, and Russell S. Winer
(1991), “The Impact of New Product Introductions on the Mar-
ket Value of Firms,” Journal of Business, 64 (October),
573–610.
Corhay, Albert and Alireza Tourani-Rad (1996), “Conditional Het-
eroskedasticity Adjusted Market Model and an Event Study,”
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 36 (4), 529–38.
Cowan, Arnold R. (1992), “Nonparametric Event Study Tests,”
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2 (4), 343–58.
Cramer, James J. (with Cliff Mason) (2006), Jim Cramer’s MAD
Money: Watch TV, Get Rich. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Dahlén, Micael and Mats Edenius (2007), “When Is Advertising
Advertising? Comparing Responses to Non-Traditional and
Traditional Advertising Media,” Journal of Current Issues &
Research in Advertising, 29 (1), 33–42.
Diamond, Douglas W. and Robert E. Verrecchia (1987), “Con-
straints on Short-Selling and Asset Price Adjustment to Private
Information,” Journal of Financial Economics, 18 (June),
277–311.
Eliashberg, Jehoshua and Thomas S. Robertson (1988), “New
Product Preannouncing Behavior: A Market Signaling Study,”
Journal of Marketing Research, 25 (August), 282–92.
Elton, J. Edwin, Martin J. Gruber, and Seth Grossman (1986),
“Discrete Expectational Data and Portfolio Performance,”
Journal of Finance, 41 (3), 699–713.
Engelberg, Joseph, Caroline Sasseville, and Jared Williams
(2006), “Is the Market Mad? Evidence from Mad Money,”
working paper, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern
University.
———, ———, and ——— (2007), “Attention and Asset Prices:
The Case of Mad Money,” working paper, Kellogg School of
Management, Northwestern University.
Erdem, Tulin and Michael P. Keane (1996), “Decision-Making
Under Uncertainty: Capturing Dynamic Brand Choice Pro-
cesses in Turbulent Consumer Goods Markets,” Marketing Sci-
ence, 15 (1), 1–21.
Fama, Eugene and Kenneth French (1996), “Multifactor Explana-
tions of Asset Pricing Anomalies,” Journal of Finance, 51
(December), 55–84.
Folkes, Valerie S. (1984), “Consumer Reactions to Product Fail-
ure: An Attributional Approach,” Journal of Consumer
Research, 10 (4), 398–409.
Frazzini, Andrea and Owen A. Lamont (2008), “Dumb Money:
Mutual Fund Flows and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 88 (2), 299–322.
Frieder, Laura and Jonathan Zittrain (2007), “Spam Works: Evi-
dence from Stock Touts and Corresponding Market Activity,”
Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 135.
Gough, Paul (2006), “‘Mad’ Man Adds Insight to CNBC Money
News,” Hollywood Reporter, (March 28), (accessed July 4,
2009), [available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/
search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1002237153].
Haley, Russell (1978), “Sales Effects of Media Weight,” Journal of
Advertising Research, 18 (June), 9–18.
Hovland, Carl I., Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelley (1953),
Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of
Opinion Change. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Huberman, G. (2001), “Familiarity Breeds Investment,” The
Review of Financial Studies, 14 (3), 659–80.
Jain, Prem C. and Joanna S. Wu (2000), “Truth in Mutual Fund
Advertising: Evidence on Future Performance and Fund
Flows,” Journal of Finance, 55 (2), 937–58.
Johnson, Joseph, Gerard J. Tellis, and Deborah MacInnis (2005),
“Losers, Winners, and Biased Trades,” Journal of Consumer
Research, 32 (2), 324–29.
Kalaignanam, Kartik, Venkatesh Shankar, and Rajan Varadarajan
(2007), “Asymmetric New Product Development Alliances:
Win-Win or Win-Lose Partnerships?” Management Science, 53
(3), 357–74.
Keller, Kevin L. (1987), “Memory Factors in Advertising: The
Effect of Advertising Retrieval Cues on Brand Evaluations,”
Journal of Consumer Research, 14 (4), 316–33.
——— (1991), “Memory and Evaluation Effects in Competitive
Advertising Environments,” Journal of Consumer Research, 17
(1), 463–76.
Kent, Robert J. and Chris T. Allen (1993), “Does Competitive
Clutter in Television Advertising ‘Interfere’ with the Recall and
Recognition of Brand Names and Ad Claims?” Marketing Let-
ters, 4 (2), 175–84.
Lim, Bryan and Joao Rosario (2008), “The Performance and
Impact of Stock Picks Mentioned on ‘Mad Money,’” (February
18), (accessed July 4, 2009), [available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1017353].
Marguardt, Donald (1970), “Generalized Inverses, Ridge Regres-
sion, Biased Linear Estimation, and Nonlinear Estimation,”
Technometrics, 12 (3), 591–612.
Mathur, Ike, Kimberly C. Gleason, Selahattin Dibooglu, and
Manohar Singh (2002), “Contagion Effects from the 1994
Mexican Peso Crisis: Evidence from Chilean Stocks,” The
Financial Review, 37 (1), 17–34.
McGill, Ann (1991), “Predicting Consumers’ Reactions to Product
Failure: Do Responsibility Judgments Follow from Con-
sumers’ Causal Explanations?” Marketing Letters, 2 (1),
59–70.
Myers, Stewart C. and Nicholas S. Majluf (1984), “Corporate
Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Infor-
mation That Investors Do Not Have,” Journal of Financial
Economics, 13 (2), 187–221.
Neumann, John J. and Peppi M. Kenny (2007), “Does Mad Money
Make the Market Go Mad?” The Quarterly Review of Econom-
ics and Finance, 47 (5), 602–615.
Olson, Jerry C. and Philip A. Dover (1978), “Cognitive Effects of
Deceptive Advertising,” Journal of Marketing Research, 15
(February), 29–39.
Pari, Robert A. (1987), “Wall $treet Week Recommendations: Yes
or No?” Journal of Portfolio Management, 14 (1), 74–76.
Pechmann, Cornelia and David W. Stewart (1988), “Advertising
Repetition: A Critical Review of Wearin and Wearout,” in Cur-
rent Issues and Research in Advertising, James H. Leigh and
Claude R. Martin Jr., eds. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan,
285–330.
Pieters, Rik G.M. and Tammo H.A. Bijmolt (1997), “Consumer
Memory for Television Advertising: A Field Study of Duration,
Serial Position, and Competition Effects,” Journal of Con-
sumer Research, 23 (4), 362–72.
———, Luk Warlop, and Michael Wedel (2002), “Breaking
Through the Clutter: Benefits of Advertisement Originality and
Familiarity for Brand Attention and Memory,” Management
Science, 48 (6), 765–81.
Richardson, Matthew, Ewa Dominowska, and Robert Ragno
(2007), “Predicting Clicks: Estimating the Click-Through Rate
for New Ads,” in Proceedings of the 16th International Confer-
ence on World Wide Web. New York: Association for Comput-
ing Machinery, 521–30.
Senchack, A.J., Jr., and Laura T. Starks (1993), “Short-Sale
Restrictions and Market Reaction to Short-Interest Announce-
266 / Journal of Marketing, November 2009
ments,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28 (2),
177–94.
Sharma, Anurag and Nelson Lacey (2004), “Linking Product
Development Outcomes to Market Valuation of the Firm: The
Case of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry,” Journal of Product
Innovation Management, 21 (5), 297–308.
Simon, Carol and Mary W. Sullivan (1993), “The Measurement
and Determinants of Brand Equity: A Financial Approach,”
Marketing Science, 12 (1), 28–52.
Simon, Hermann (1982), “ADPULS: An Advertising Model with
Wearout and Pulsation,” Journal of Marketing Research, 19
(August), 352–63.
Sood, Ashish and Gerard J. Tellis (2009), “Do Innovations Really
Pay Off? Total Stock Market Returns to Innovation,” Marketing
Science, 28 (3), 442–56.
Sprent, Peter (1989), Applied Nonparametric Statistical Methods.
London: Chapman and Hall.
Srinivasan, Raji and Sundar Bharadwaj (2004), “Event Studies in
Marketing Strategy Research,” in Assessing Marketing Strategy
Performance, Christine Moorman and Donald R. Lehmann,
eds. Cambridge, MA: Marketing Science Institute, 9–28.
The Stalwart (2005), “Jim Cramer Might Be a Liar,” (July 26),
(accessed July 6, 2009), [available at http://www.thestalwart.
com/the_stalwart/2005/07/jim_cramer_migh.html].
Tavits, Margit (2007), “Principle vs. Pragmatism: Policy Shifts
and Political Competition,” American Journal of Political Sci-
ence, 51 (1), 151–65.
Television Bureau of Advertising (2009), “Media Trends Track:
TNS Media Intelligence Annual Averages,” (accessed July 6,
2009), [available at http://www.tvb.org/rcentral/mediatrends
track/tvbasics/26_Net_TV_Activity.asp].
Tellis, Gerard J. and Joseph Johnson (2007), “The Value of Qual-
ity,” Marketing Science, 26 (6), 758–73.
Webb, Peter H. (1979), “Consumer Initial Processing in a Difficult
Media Environment,” Journal of Consumer Research, 6 (3),
225–36.
——— and Michael L. Ray (1979), “Effects of TV Clutter,” Jour-
nal of Advertising Research, 19 (3), 7–12.
Wheatley, John J. (1968), “Influence of Commercial’s Length and
Position,” Journal of Marketing Research, 5 (May), 199–202.
White, Halbert (1982), “Instrumental Variables Regression with
Independent Observations,” Econometrica, 50 (2), 483–500.
Wiles, Michael A. and Anna Danielova (2009), “The Worth of
Product Placement in Successful Films: An Event Study Analy-
sis,” Journal of Marketing, 73 (July), 44–63.
Winter, Fredrick W. (1973), “A Laboratory Experiment of Individ-
ual Attitude Response to Advertising Exposure,” Journal of
Marketing Research, 10 (May), 130–40.
Womack, Kent L. (1996), “Do Brokerage Analysts’ Recommenda-
tions Have Investment Value?” Journal of Finance, 51 (1),
137–67.
Zellner, Arnold (1962), “An Efficient Method of Estimating Seem-
ingly Unrelated Regressions and Tests for Aggregation Bias,”
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 57 (298),
348–68.
Zhao, Xinshu (1997), “Clutter and Serial Order Redefined and
Retested,” Journal of Advertising Research, 37 (5), 57–73.

